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WHEN DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS
OCCURS IN BANKRUPTCY
— by Neil E. Harl*
  The farm debt crisis of the 1980’s1 left numerous
legacies, not the least of which is the continuing discharge
of indebtedness from formal and informal resolutions of
excessive debt.2  The various rules on when discharge of
indebtedness occurs have created surprising and painful
results for some taxpayers.
When discharge occurs in bankruptcy
The question of when discharge of indebtedness occurs in
bankruptcy depends upon which chapter of bankruptcy is
involved.3
•  In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, if no objections are
sustained, discharge normally takes place 60 days after the
meeting of creditors at which the debtor appears and is
examined under oath.4  As a consequence, discharge
ordinarily occurs soon after bankruptcy filing.
• Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, discharge of indebtedness
occurs upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization as to
debts arising before confirmation, with some exceptions.5
Thus, discharge of indebtedness ordinarily takes place within
a few months after bankruptcy filing.
• By contrast, in Chapter 12 bankruptcy discharge of
indebtedness occurs “as soon as practicable” after completion
of payments under the plan.6  That means discharge
ordinarily takes place more than three years after bankruptcy
filing and it could be more than five years after filing,
depending upon the length of the Chapter 12 reorganization
plan.
•  In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, discharge likewise occurs
upon completion of payments under the plan.7  Again, that
is usually more than three years after bankruptcy filing.
Consequences of discharge in bankruptcy
Indebtedness cancelled as a result of bankruptcy is not
included in the debtor's income.8  IRS has ruled, as expected,
that Chapter  12 debtors  are "in bankruptcy" for purposes of
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discharge of indebtedness.9  Thus, even though no new tax
entity is created on Chapter 12 filing for individuals,10 those
filing under Chapter 12 bankruptcy are eligible for the so-
called "bankruptcy" exception to the general rule that
discharge of indebtedness produces ordinary income.11  The
result is no immediate tax liability from discharge of
indebtedness; rather, the income tax consequences to the
debtor are largely postponed until the debtor's property is
sold (on which basis was reduced) or the reduced tax
attributes (credits and losses) could have been used.12 Excess
discharge of indebtedness need not be reported into income.
Note that discharge of indebtedness for Chapter 12
debtors does not come under the rule for solvent farm debtors
(which requires that discharge of indebtedness be reported
into income for solvent debtors after reduction of tax
attributes and basis of property),13 even though the debtor is
solvent at the time of discharge of indebtedness as is required
for the solvent farm debtor rule to apply.14  Thus, the fact
that the Chapter 12 debtor is "in bankruptcy" continues to
clothe the debtor from the full measure of consequences of
discharge of indebtedness.
That is because, for debtors in bankruptcy, once tax
attributes have been reduced and the basis of the debtor's
property has been reduced down to the indebtedness15 (or to
zero if the election is made to reduce the basis of property
before the other tax attributes are reduced)16 the debtor is not
required to recognize any remaining discharge of indebtedness
into income.17
This factor can be of immense importance to Chapter 12
bankruptcy filers who often are solvent by the time
indebtedness is discharged upon completion of payments
under the plan.18  Chapter 12 debtors can, therefore,
generally sidestep much of the adverse consequences of
discharge of indebtedness in bankruptcy.  For those Chapter
12 filers who are able to use up operating loss, capital loss
and credit carryovers by the time of discharge of indebtedness
and who have indebtedness equal to or greater than the basis
of assets subject to basis reduction,19 there may be no
negative consequences of discharge of indebtedness.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS. A hospital perfected statutory
liens against the proceeds of an automobile accident
insurance policy received by the debtor resulting from an
automobile accident. The debtor claimed an exemption for
the insurance proceeds and avoidance of the hospital lien as
impairing the exemption. The court held that because the
hospital lien arose purely by act of statute, the lien could
not be avoided and had priority over the debtor's exemption
claim. In re  Pohrman, 146 B.R. 570 (Bankr. D .
Or. 1992).
The debtors sought to avoid a judgment lien against their
homestead which was claimed as an exemption. The
judgment creditor argued that because the debtor had waived
the homestead exemption as to the judgment lien when the
lien attached, the debtor was precluded from claiming the
homestead exemption as to the judgment lien. The court
held that under North Carolina case law, a waiver applied
only to the execution of the judgment lien and that a
bankruptcy filing was treated as a separate execution for
which a separate waiver would have to be filed. Thus, the
judgment lien could be avoided because the debtors had not
waived the homestead exemption in the bankruptcy case. In
re  Pinner, 146 B.R. 659 (Bankr. E.D. N . C .
1992) .
IRA. The debtors’ interests in custodial IRA’s were held
to be exempt under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 110, ¶ 12-1006 where
the IRA’s were established with a good faith intent to
qualify under the Internal Revenue Code. The court also held
that the IRA’s did not need to qualify as spendthrift trusts in
order to be exempt. In re  Templeton, 146 B.R. 7 5 7
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
  CHAPTER 13  
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors’ Chapter 13
plan provided for a 41 percent payment of unsecured
creditors’ claims and provided for personal expenses to
include $614 per month for tuition and rent for a child in
college. A creditor argued that the tuition and rent should be
included in disposable income as excessive and unnecessary
personal expenses. The court held that because the child was
a senior and was attending a low cost state college, the
expenses were necessary and not unreasonable, especially
where the unsecured creditors were receiving 41 percent of
their claims and would receive nothing in a Chapter 7 case.
In re  Riegodedios, 146 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E . D .
Va. 1992).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
CLAIMS. An IRS late-filed claim amendment for over
$2 million in unpaid taxes was denied because the
amendment was significantly different from the original
claim for $11,000.  The court held that the existence of an
ongoing audit of the tax returns for the tax years subject to
the claim did not excuse the IRS for failure to seek ex-
tension of time to file claims.  In re  Stavriotis, 9 7 7
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'g , 129 B.R. 5 2 7
(N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'g , 103 B.R. 1005 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989).
EXCISE TAXES.  The debtor filed for bankruptcy in
July 1986 and the IRS filed claims for 1984, 1985 and 1986
for the excise tax on accumulated funding deficiencies in the
debtor's ERISA plans. The debtor had obtained a waiver for
1984 and was current on payment terms up to the filing for
bankruptcy but stopped making payments after the filing.
No waiver was obtained for 1985 but the bankruptcy filing
occurred before the latest date for which the deficiency could
have been paid without penalty. The 1986 liability occurred
post-petition. The court held that the excise tax for all three
years would not be allowed because the liability arose post-
petition and would violate the automatic stay. For 1984, the
waiver acted as a credit to relieve the deficiency until
payments were not made under the waiver agreement. The
court held that a retroactive provision was invalid as
contrary to statute. In re  Chateaugay Corp., 1 4 6
B.R. 626 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).
JURISDICTION. Under the debtor's plan, an amount
was to be paid to a third party who filed a claim in the case.
The plaintiff had a judgment lien against the property of the
